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Abstract 
	
Availability evaluation of a virtualized system is critical to the wide deployment of cloud computing services. 
Time-based, prediction-based rejuvenation of virtual machines (VM) and virtual machine monitors (VMM), VM 
failover, and live VM migration are common high-availability (HA) techniques in a virtualized system. This paper 
investigates the effect of combination of these availability techniques on VM availability in a virtualized system 
where various software and hardware failures may occur. For each combination, we construct analytic models 
rejuvenation mechanisms improve VM availability; (2) prediction-based rejuvenation enhances VM availability 
much more than time-based VM rejuvenation when prediction successful probability is above 70%, regardless 
failover and/or live VM migration are also deployed; (3) failover mechanism outperforms live VM migration, 
although they can work together for higher availability of VM. In addition, they can combine with software 
rejuvenation mechanisms for even higher availability; (4) and time interval setting is critical to a time-based 
rejuvenation mechanism. These analytic results provide guidelines for deploying and parameter setting of HA 
techniques in a virtualized system. 
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1. Introduction 
System virtualization technology has been widely adopted for academic and industrial purposes. In a virtualized 
system [1], a virtual machine monitor (VMM) is a software layer between (one or more) operating systems and a 
physical hardware able to emulate hardware of a physical machine. Thus, it plays a critical role in the virtualized 
system, often becoming the single point of failure. A virtual machine (VM) emulates a particular computer system, 
running on the top of VMM. Like traditional software, VM and VMM are also subject to software-related problems 
as software aging, bugs, crashes, and so on [2]-[4]. These problems clearly reduce the VM availability and increase 
VM downtime. Without loss of generality, we use application availability and VM availability interchangeably. 
Large downtime of applications may lead to productivity loss and even revenue loss [5][6]. Software rejuvenation, 
failover, and live VM migration are common high availability (HA) techniques used in a virtualized system [7][8]. 
The tremendous growth in the deployment of virtualized systems demands the availability analysis of these systems 
with HA techniques [7].  
State-space models are expressive and popular models applied to availability analysis in different domains, such 
as cluster computing systems, telecommunication systems, or air control systems, among others [9]-[13]. In 
particular, they are found also effective for VM availability analysis [14]. The existing model-based VM availability 
analysis ignored the existence of VMM failures [15]-[17], assumed that one type failure exists in the considered 
system [15][16][18][19], considered only rejuvenation mechanisms [20][21], or considered only a physical host 
[19][22][23]. Thus, their analyses did not capture the effect of live VM migration on VM availability. Similarly, to 
assume only one VM in a host [20][24][25] cannot capture the effect of VM failover on VM availability. 
In this paper, we consider a virtualized system composed with three main components: Main host, Backup host, 
and Management host. Main host includes active and standby (or backup) VMs. Backup host contains only standby 
VMs. Applications are deployed in the active VM. When the active VM fails, different actions may happen 
according to the restoring policy, such as the use of a standby VM on the same host, the migration to the other host, 
or simply the failed VM is restarted. This paper aims to investigate the effect of software rejuvenation, failover, and 
live VM migration techniques on the VM availability in a virtualized system with a variety of failures. We assume 
that these HA techniques are ready to be used and their implementations are out of the scope of this paper. 
The contribution of this paper is three-fold: first, we investigate VM availability in a virtualized system with 
several co-existing failures, including hardware, shared storage, live VM migration, non-aging Mandelbug-related, 
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and aging-related failures (in both VM and VMM). Second, we construct stochastic reward nets (SRN) models for 
each combination of software rejuvenation, failover, and live VM migration in order to analyze the induced effect 
of these techniques over VM availability. We also investigate whether some of these HA techniques could work 
together to improve the VM availability and the capability of this cooperation. Third, we carry out sensitivity 
analysis to investigate the effect of model parameters on the ability of software rejuvenation, failover, and live VM 
migration mechanisms in improving VM availability. 
The proposed SRN models help to select the combination of failure recovery techniques and the parameter 
settings of a given scenario. Our numeric results indicate that: 
(1) Both VMM rejuvenation and VM rejuvenation mechanisms enhance system availability when various 
failures co-exist. 
(2) Prediction-based VM rejuvenation mechanism improves the VM availability in a higher degree than time-
based VM rejuvenation mechanism, when prediction successful probability is above 70% and regardless 
failover and/or live VM migration are deployed. 
(3) Failover mechanism performs better than live VM migration and they can work together for higher 
availability. In addition, they can work with software rejuvenation mechanisms for achieving even higher 
availability. 
(4) Rejuvenation time interval setting is critical to a time-based rejuvenation mechanism. VMM clock interval 
is critical for the ability of live VM migration technique in improving VM steady-state availability. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the related work about HA techniques and 
model-based VM availability analysis. Section 3 introduces the system architecture considered in this paper. Section 
4 describes SRN models constructed for analysis. The numerical analysis and discussion are presented in Section 5. 
Section 6 concludes this paper and discusses the future work. 
2. Related Work 
Both software failures and hardware component faults may lead to failures into a virtualized system and then 
reduce VM availability. Software failures are caused by inherent software design bugs. In [34], the authors classified 
software bugs into the following three main categories: 
(1) Bohrbug, which manifests a failure when certain fixed set of conditions are met.  
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(2) Non-aging related Mandelbug, whose activation and/or error propagation is complicated and uncertain.  
(3) Aging related Mandelbug, whose activation process is related to an accumulation of errors or resources 
consumption. 
Bohrbug can be easily fixed. The left two kinds of bugs are hard to mitigate. In this paper, we ignore Bohrbugs 
and focus on non-aging related Mandelbugs. Both of the non-aging related Mandelbugs and the aging-related bugs 
occur on the VMMs and VMs subsystems [24]. When the non-aging related Mandelbugs failures happen, the VMM 
or VM would be in crash and need to be repaired. For long-running VMMs and VMs, software aging is one of the 
major causes of software failures [3]. Software aging has been observed in many systems, including web servers 
and enterprise clusters [26][27]. Software aging not only increases the failure rate and thus degrades the system 
performance, but also leads to system crashes [2]. Software rejuvenation [3] is a software fault tolerance technique 
to defend against software aging. This technique gracefully stops the execution of an application/system and 
periodically restarts it at a clean internal state in a proactive manner. Two main kinds of software rejuvenation 
approaches are distinguished: 
• Time-based rejuvenation. Rejuvenation is triggered by a clock counting time. Analytical models help finding 
out the optimal interval to maximize availability and minimize downtime cost. 
• Prediction-based rejuvenation. Rejuvenation is triggered when the system behaviors meet some predefined 
criteria or particular conditions. Machine learning, statistical approaches, structural models, and other 
techniques have been applied to define such conditions.  
Besides software rejuvenation, failover solution and live VM migration are the most common techniques used 
for achieving VM high availability in virtualized systems, such as VMware ESXi [28]. Failover is a backup 
operational mechanism, in which the functions of a system component (e.g., a processor, server, network, or database) 
are assumed by secondary system components when the primary component becomes unavailable due to failure or 
shut-down scheduled. In a virtualized system, failover is achieved by creating an active VM and a standby VM. 
When the active VM suffers a failure or gets ready to be rejuvenated, the standby VM takes over the role of the 
active VM to continue task execution. Live VM migration refers to the process of moving a running VM or 
application between different physical machines without affecting the execution of applications. The information of 
memory, storage, and network connectivity of the original VM is transferred from the original host to the destination 
host. 
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Recently studies have been carried out for the VM availability analysis by adopting analytic modeling approach, 
specially using state-space models. A single server virtualized system with multiple VMs was modeled and analyzed 
in [15][16], where it was shown that the combination of failover mechanism with VM software rejuvenation 
technique enhanced VM availability in these systems. In [17], a continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) based 
analytical model to capture the behavior of the virtualized clustering system with VM software rejuvenation was 
presented. In particular, system availability with the VM time-based rejuvenation mechanisms under different cluster 
configurations were analyzed, and results showed that the integration of virtualization, clustering, and software 
rejuvenation improved system availability.	All these works [15]-[17] neglected the existence of VMM failures in 
the virtualized system. However, the VMM plays a critical role in improving system availability. In [18], only VMM 
software aging-triggering failures were considered. 
The design of effective approaches for software rejuvenation on a virtualized system in order to improve VM 
availability have also been addressed. In [24], three VM rejuvenation techniques (namely cold-VM rejuvenation, 
warm-VM rejuvenation, and migrate-VM rejuvenation) were proposed for virtualized systems with VMM and VM 
aging-related failures. Their numerical results indicated that migrate-VM rejuvenation outperformed the others as 
long as the VM migration rate was fast enough. Unlike our paper, they assumed only one VM on Main host and no 
prediction-based rejuvenation techniques. Besides the failures mentioned in [24], in this paper we consider shared 
storage failures and non-aging Mandelbugs-related failures. We also consider that the virtualized system is 
composed by two VMs on a host and investigate the ability of failover mechanism. Moreover, we compare the 
abilities of time-based VM rejuvenation and prediction-based rejuvenation techniques in improving VM availability. 
A single-server virtualized system where several VMs are instantiated on a VMM is considered in [19]. However, 
only VMM aging-related failure and time-based VMM rejuvenation techniques were considered. In [20], a system 
architecture with two hosts is analyzed where each host disposed a VM running on the VMM. They proposed a 
hierarchical stochastic model based on Fault Tree and CTMC that described hardware failures of different nature 
(e.g., CPU, memory, power, etc.), software failures (VMs, VMM, application) and corresponding recovery 
behaviors. However, this model does not cover completely the dependencies of behaviors between hardware and 
software subsystems (see Section 3.2). In [21], Nguyen et al. proposed a comprehensive availability model for a 
virtualized system with two hosts where each host runs two VMs on the VMM. They considered diverse failures, 
such as hardware, shared storage, aging-related, and non-aging Mandelbugs-related failures, as well as 
corresponding recovery behaviors modeled with SRN. They used a cold-VM rejuvenation to drastically push a VM 
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in the running state into DOWN state. Failover and live VM migration mechanisms were both ignored in [20]and 
[21]. Furthermore, these works only considered the time-based rejuvenation technique. In this paper, we consider 
software rejuvenation, failover and live VM migration techniques, as well as time-based and prediction-based 
rejuvenation techniques. 
A new hybrid rejuvenation technique which combined time-based rejuvenation mechanism for VMM and 
prediction-based rejuvenation mechanism for VMs was presented in [22]. They demonstrated that such combination 
produced higher system availability and lower downtime cost than using just prediction-based or time-based 
rejuvenation for VMs. SRN models for availability of a single-server virtualized system were presented in [23], 
where the abilities of VM time-based rejuvenation and VM prediction-based rejuvenation were compared. Both 
works considered only one host, and did not consider non-aging Mandelbug-related failures and hardware failures. 
These works used a failover mechanism (active VM and standby VM on the same host), but did not consider live 
VM migration as this paper does. As in [23], we compare VM time-based rejuvenation with VM prediction-based 
rejuvenation, but in a scenario with a variety of failures. 
An availability model of a data center (DC) with live VM migration and failover mechanisms was introduced in 
[24] to ensure the high availability of cloud based businesses. Different failures were considered, such as hardware, 
shared storage, virtual DC failures, among others. Unlike our work, they did not distinguish non-aging Mandelbug-
related failures from aging-related failures for VM. Furthermore, the effect of VMM failure on VM availability was 
analyzed by investigating host hardware failure. Note that VM live migration is performed only when VMM runs 
in virtualized systems. Thus, it is difficult, if not impossible, to analyze the effect of live VM migration on VM 
availability in a virtualized system.  
In [35], the authors proposed a cloud availability model for the cloud data center with three PM pools of switched 
on, standby, and switched off PMs. They only considered PM failures and applied backup PMs for improving 
availability. In [36], the authors applied SRNs to analyze the system availability, which was defined as the 
probability that a job did not traverse any failure states during its execution. They considered as failure any deviation 
of a job execution from the correct life cycle, including queuing failures, running failures, aborts and exiting failures. 
Actually, these failures can be classified to aging-related failure or Non-aging Mandelbug related failure. Job 
checkpointing and job replication were adopted for improving the availability. In our paper, we consider not only 
software failures but also hardware failures. In addition, the recovery techniques considered in our paper include 
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checkpointing, failover and live VM migration. Furthermore, we consider the difference of VM software failures on 
the system availability from VMM. 
3. System Architecture and Component Interaction 
This section first relates the system architecture that we consider in this paper, and then the interplay between 
its components. Note that current cloud data centers may easily adapt their architectures to the proposed scheme 
when enough physical resources are available.  
3.1. Description of the System Architecture 
Figure 1 depicts the system considered in this paper. It is mainly composed of three components: Main host, 
Backup host, and Management host. Main host contains a VMM, which runs an active VM with a desired application, 
and a standby VM. Backup host is a spare host that performs the Main host role when a VM migration occurs. It 
disposes a standby VM used by the failover mechanism after Backup host takes the role of Main host.	Finally, 
Management host is a component responsible for detecting VMM failures and host hardware failures by means of 
specific management tools. VM images or VMM code files are stored in a shared storage within the system. Software 
rejuvenation agent (SRA), installed in each VM, is responsible for the VM rejuvenation operation. Rejuvenation 
manager (RM) is installed in the VMM in order to analyze the behaviors of VMs deployed on this VMM, detect 
anomalies and trigger the rejuvenation of malfunctioning VM. 
 
Figure. 1. System architecture considered in this paper 
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The VMs on the same host inform each other about their health using a heartbeat mechanism when failover is 
deployed. The running state of an active VM can be stored in the shared storage and later sent to the standby VM to 
be recovered. We consider that an active VM may suffer non-aging Mandelbug-related and aging related failures. 
When an active VM suffers from these failures, the active VM stops accepting requests and needs to be repaired. 
Thus, the standby VM plays the role of the active VM during its repair period and takes charge of the tasks. Let us 
remark this change in the standby VM is performed very quickly due to failover mechanism. The malfunctioning 
VM will turn to be standby VM after reparation, rejuvenation, or recovery is completed. 
Live VM migration (when deployed) can be used to migrate the active VM to Backup host when the VMM 
needs to be rejuvenated. This technique moves an active VM, with all the requests and sessions, from Main host to 
Backup host without loss in any in-flight request or session data during the rejuvenation or repair. Pre-copy [29] and 
stay-on methods have been proved to be effective methods in the live VM migration process [24]. Herein, we 
consider pre-copy migration because it causes less downtime. Thus, as response to a VM migration request, the 
memory of the active VM is copied to Backup host without interrupting its operation. 
3.2. Interplay between Components 
Instead of analyzing the overall effect of hardware, non-aging Mandelbug-related, and software aging-related 
failures, we consider the effect of each failure respectively in order to capture realistic behavior of a virtualized 
system. This section introduces the state transitions for each component within the system. In particular, we focus 
on failures in Main host, Backup host, shared storage, VMM, and VMs. Failures occurring on standby VM and 
Management host are ignored. 
Main host and shared storage have two states: UP and FAIL state. For VMM, there exist five states when no 
rejuvenation mechanisms are used: UP state (healthy state without software aging), FP state (probable failing state 
but VMM still runs), FAIL state (a software aging-related failure occurs and then VMM stops running), CRASH 
state (a non-aging Mandelbug-related failure occurs and then VMM stops running), and DOWN state (a hardware 
failure occurs in the host and VMM stops running). When using time-based rejuvenation for VMM, we define an 
additional REJU state to identify when the VMM is ready to be rejuvenated. 
Finally, VM states are different depending on the rejuvenation mechanisms used. In this paper, we consider time-
based and prediction-based rejuvenation mechanisms. When no rejuvenation is applied, an active VM has five states 
similar to states of a VMM: UP state, FP state, FAIL state, CRASH state, and DOWN state. In the latter state, the 
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VMM is not in UP or FP state, or shared storage is in FAIL state. When time-based rejuvenation is applied, there is 
an extra REJU state as VMM does. Similarly, prediction-based rejuvenation mechanism introduces three additional 
states: DETECT state (software aging in VM is detected), UNDETECT state (software aging is undetected) and 
REJU state. 
Since there exists dependencies between components, the change of a component state clearly triggers the 
change of state of its dependent component. In the following, we enumerate the dependencies between the 
components and the related state transitions: 
(1) Between host and VMM. When a host fails into FAIL state, the running VMM (in UP or FP state) moves to 
DOWN state in which the VMM subsystem becomes unavailable. The VMM in DOWN state can restart to UP state 
when the host returns to UP state. When the host goes into FAIL state, the VMM in CRASH, REJU, or FAIL states 
is suspended and reloaded from the memory after the host is repaired. 
(2) Between VMM and VM. When the VMM is in FAIL, DOWN, or CRASH states, the active VM (in UP or 
FP state) then turns to DOWN state and the standby VM is suspended. When the VMM of Main host needs to be 
rejuvenated (e.g., it is REJU state), rejuvenation techniques such as warm-VM reboot [30] and VM migration 
(detailed SRN models are given in Section 4) can be applied to lead VM to UP state again. 
(3) Between shared storage and VM. Recall that VM image files are stored on the shared storage. Thus, the 
state of the shared storage has a great impact on the VM states. When the shared storage fails, the VMs in running 
states (either UP or FP state) move to DOWN state. When the shared storage completes its repairing, the VMs are 
restarted to UP state. When the current state of a VM is not in running state, its operation state is temporarily 
suspended and resumed after the shared storage returns to UP state. 
4. Availability SRN Models 
All time intervals are assumed to follow exponential distributions, except for rejuvenation-triggered intervals. 
As in [38], this paper uses a 10-stage Erlang distribution for approximating these deterministic transitions. SRN 
[31][32] is a formalism widely used in rejuvenation modeling. In order to understand the ability of each HA 
mechanism in improving the VM availability, we develop SRN models for nine policies, described in Table 1. Each 
policy represents a combination of the HA mechanisms. Let ABCD be used to represent a policy. Each item is 
defined as follows: 
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A= { = T: denotes that VMM implements a time-based rejuvenation mechanism  = N: denotes that no HA mechanism is implemented in VMM  
  
B={ 
= T: denotes that VM implements a time-based rejuvenation mechanism 
= P: denotes that VM implements a prediction-based rejuvenation mechanism 
= N: denotes no rejuvenation mechanism is implemented in VM 
  
C= { =F: denotes that failover is implemented =N: denotes that no failover is implemented 
  
D= { =M : denotes that live VM migration is deployed =N : denotes that no live VM migration is deployed 
 
Table 1. Description of nine policies used in this paper 
Policy Description 
NNNN No HA technique deployed for VMM and VM 
TNNN Only time-based rejuvenation used for VMM 
TNFN Time-based rejuvenation for VMM and failover mechanism for VM  
TNNM Time-based rejuvenation for VMM and live VM migration for VM  
TTNM Time-based rejuvenation for VMM, live VM migration and time-based rejuvenation for VM  
TPNM Time-based rejuvenation for VMM, live VM migration and prediction-based rejuvenation for VM  
TNFM Time-based rejuvenation for VMM, failover and Live VM migration and no rejuvenation for VM  
TTFM Time-based rejuvenation for VMM, failover and Live VM migration and time-based rejuvenation for VM 
TPFM Time-based rejuvenation for VMM, failover and Live VM migration and prediction-based rejuvenation for VM 
	
4.1. Stochastic Reward Nets 
A Stochastic Reward Net is a stochastic Petri net with many advanced structural and stochastic characteristics 
[31][32]. In SRN, an enabling function (also called a guard) allows to define the enabling function of a transition as 
a marking dependent function. In addition, both arc multiplicities and firing rates are allowed to be marking-
dependent. SRN allow to compute measures of interests by defining reward rates at net level. 
In the following, we first introduce the models for host, shared storage, VMM, VMM clock, and VM clock sub-
models. These models are unchangeable regardless of policies. Next, we describe the models for the policies 
considered in this paper. Table 2 summarized the parameters used in the rest of this section, as well as the 
corresponding transitions and values used for numerical analysis. Most values are set according to [21, 23, 24] and 
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the corresponding references are given in the last column. The values without references are set by ourselves 
according to the values with references. 
Table 2. Default parameters used in the models 
Symbol Description Transition Values(/h) Mean time 
λvfp VM aging-related rate  Tvfp, Tv1fp, Tv2fp  0.005952381 1 week [24] 
λvfail VM aging-related failure rate Tvfail, Tv1fail, Tv2fail 0.013888889 3days [24] 
λcrash VM non-aging Mandelbug related failure rate  Tvcrash, Tv1crash, Tv2crash 0.00034722 120days 
λreup VM non-aging Mandelbug -related repair rate  Tvreup, Tv1reup, Tv2reup 2 30mins 
λvrepair VM repair rate  Tvrepair,Tv1repair, Tv2repair 2 30mins [24] 
λvreju VM rejuvenation rate  Tvreju, Tv1reju, Tv2reju 60 1min [24] 
λswt VM switch rate  Tswt1reju, Tswt2reju 1200 3s [23] 
λvstart VM restart rate  Tvstart, Tv1start, Tv2start 120 30s [24] 
Λinterval VM clock interval - 0.04166667 1day [24] 
λdetect VM detect probability - 0.9 N/A [23] 
λpre VM migration prepare rate  
Tvpre, Tvback, 
Tvfpre, Tvfpback, 
90 40s [[24] 
λmigs VM migration successful probability - 0.9 N/A [24] 
βhfp VMM aging rate, namely rate of transition  Th1fp,Th2fp 0.001388889 1 month [24] 
βhfail VMM aging-related failure rate  Th1fail, Th2fail 0.005952381 1 week [24] 
βcrash VMM non-aging Mandelbug- related failure rate  Th1crash, Th 1crash 0.00046296 90days 
βreup VMM non-aging Mandelbug- related repair rate  Th1reup, Th2reup 0.5 2hours 
βhrepair VMM repair rate  Th1repair, Th2repair 1 1 hour [24] 
βhreju VMM rejuvenation rate  Th1reju, Th2reju 30 2mins [24] 
βhstart VMM restart rate  Th1start, Th2start 60 1min [24] 
βinterval VMM clock interval - 0.005952381 1week [24] 
βwfail Host failure rate  Tw1fail, Tw2fail 0.00023148 180days [21] 
βwrepair Host repair rate  Tw1repair, Tw2repair 0.01388889 3days [21] 
Βssf Shared storage failure rate  Tfail 0.00011574 360 days [21] 
Βssr Shared storage repair rate Trepair 0.01388889 3 days [21] 
 
4.2. SRN Models for System Components 
 Host model, depicted in Figure 2(a), expresses the occurrence of hardware failure and repair process of Main 
host. We consider a system with two hosts. At the beginning, host1 is Main host and host2 is Backup host. After live 
VM migration, host2 becomes Main host and host1 becomes Backup host after repair. When host1 (host2) is Main 
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host, host1 (host2) is at first in UP state, represented by one token in Pw1up (Pw2up) place. When a hardware failure 
occurs, the transition tw1fail (tw2fail) fires and the token in Pw1up (Pw2up) is taken out and deposited in Pw1fail (Pw2fail). 
After the hardware repair process completes, the token is moved from Pw1fail(Pw2fail) to Pw1up (Pw2up) by firing the 
transition Tw1repair (Tw2repair), representing the host in UP state again. 
The shared storage failure and repair process is similar to the host model, as depicted by Figure 2(b). We assume 
that shared storage is in UP state in the general case. Due to unexpected failures, the shared storage shuts down and 
then falls into FAIL state (namely, the token is moved from place Pup to place Pfail). A delay is required to detect the 
fault position of the shared storage and its repairing. Then, the shared storage returns to UP state. 
Figure 2(c) depicts VMM failure and VMM recovery process for Main host1. When host1 (host2) is Main host1, 
at first there is a token in place Ph1up (Ph2up), denoting no software aging exists in the VMM. The VMM software 
aging occurs after continuously running for a period of time. After a while, the transition Th1fp (Th2fp) fires and a 
token is moved from Ph1up (Ph2up) to Ph1fp (Ph2fp). When the transition Th1fail (Th2fail) fires, the token from Ph1fp (Ph2fp) 
is deposited in Ph1fail (Ph2fail) which represents the VMM failure due to software aging. When a non-aging 
Mandelbug-related failure occurs, the VMM in UP state turns directly to CRASH state, represented by the removal 
of token from place Ph1up (Ph2up) and placed in Ph1crash (Ph2crash). When the failure of VMM is detected by the 
management tool that executes in Management host, then VMM enters into the repair process. After VMM is 
repaired, the transition Th1repair (Th2repair) or Th1reup (Th2reup) – depending on the type of failure fires and the token is 
moved from Ph1fail (Ph2fail) or Ph1crash (Ph2crash) to ph1up (Ph2up), denoting that the VMM enters UP state. 
When a hardware failure occurs, the VMM in UP or FP state shuts down at once by firing the transition thidw, 
and the token is deposited in Ph1dw (Ph2dw). As soon as the hardware failure is removed, a token is taken from Ph1dw 
(Ph2dw) to Ph1up (Ph2up), denoting that VMM restarts and enters into UP state. When the VMM is in CRASH, FAIL, 
or REJU state), the VMM is suspended in memory and quickly reloaded to continue normal execution after the 
hardware failure is repaired. 
When the VMM needs to be rejuvenated, the token is moved from Ph1up (Ph2up) or Ph1fp (Ph2fp) to Ph1reju (Ph2reju) 
by firing immediate transitions th1rejt (th2rejt) or th1fprejt (th2fprejt), depending on the current state before rejuvenation 
																																								 																				 	
1As before, we use i = 1 notation to refer to VMM in host1 which performs as Main host and i = 2 to refer to 
VMM in host2. 
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takes place. After the rejuvenation finishes, a token in the Ph1reju (Ph2reju) is moved to Ph1up (Ph2up) only when host is 
in UP state (places Pw1up, Pw2up) and there exists a token in place Ph1clock (Ph2clock). 
 
 (a) Host SRN model 
 
(b) Shared storage SRN model 
 
 (c) VMM SRN model 
 
(d) VMM clock SRN model 
 
(e) VM clock SRN model 
Figure. 2. SRN models for different system components 
 
Figure 2(d) depicts the SRN of the VMM clock, used to trigger VMM time-based rejuvenation with a rate of 
βinterval. When the transition Th1interval (Th2interval) fires after the last boot time, a token is moved from Ph1clock (Ph2clock) 
to ph1policy (ph2policy). The guard function gh1policy in th1policy (th2policy) ensures the VM has been shut down or migrated 
to Backup host. Then, the token in Ph1policy (Ph2policy) is moved to Ph1trigger (Ph2trigger) and the VMM rejuvenation process 
begins. After the VMM rejuvenation completes, the immediate transition th1reset (th2reset) enables and the token in 
Ph1trigger (Ph2trigger) is moved to Ph1clock (Ph2clock) again, which denotes counting the time for executing the next VMM 
rejuvenation period.  
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Similarly, Figure 2(e) depicts the VM clock model, used to trigger VM time-based rejuvenation with a rate of 
Λinterval. When transition Tvinterval fires after the last boot time, the token is moved from Pvclock to Pvpolicy. The immediate 
transition tvpolicy is enabled when the VM in UP or FP state and shared storage is in UP state. Then, the token in 
Pvpolicy is deposited in Pvtrigger and the VM rejuvenation process begins. After this process completes, the immediate 
transition tvreset fires and the token in Pvtrigger is placed in Pvclock, which denotes counting the time for executing the 
next VM rejuvenation period. 
4.3. SRN Models for Combination of Policies 
We first describe SRN models for NNNN, TNNN, and TNFN policies, since they have similar sub-models and 
features. As live VM migration is not implemented (i.e., D = N), Backup host is ignored in these policies. Policy 
NNNN consists of four sub-models: (1) Host1 model shown in Figure 2(a); (2) shared storage model shown in 
Figure 2(b); (3) VMM1 model shown in Figure 2(c); and (4) VM model shown in Figure 3(a). Since there is no 
rejuvenation process for VM and no failover mechanism in both policies NNNN and TNNN, they have the same 
VM sub-model. Policy TNNN has an additional sub-model compared to policy NNNN. Namely, the VMM1 clock 
model shown in Figure 2(d). Policy TNFN differs from TNNN just for a special VM model that uses a failover 
mechanism, as depicted in Figure 3(b). Guard functions used in the above models are summarized in Table 3. 
In the following, we explain the Figure 3(a). A VM may suffer from non-aging Mandelbug-related and aging-
related failures. Failure and recovery processes are similar to those in VMM model. Initially, one token exists in 
Pvup, representing the VM is in fully stable state. Later on, the VM transits to FP state, i.e., the token is moved from 
Pvup to Pvfp through the transition Tvfp representing VM software aging. Note that the VM still works in FP state, but 
its failure likelihood increases. Since no VM rejuvenation process is deployed in these policies, the aging VM then 
turns to FAIL state after a certain period of time. This state transition is represented by the token being moved from 
Pvfp to Pvfail, after firing of the transition Tvfail. After VM is repaired, it changes to UP state. That is, the token is 
moved from Pvfail to Pvup. When the VM suffers from non-aging Mandelbug-related failures, the VM falls to CRASH 
state (i.e., the token is moved from Pvup to place Pvcrash) and waits for repair. When places Ph1fail, Ph1dw, or Ph1crash are 
marked, or shared storage is failed, the token is moved from Pvup (or Pvfp) to Pvdw. When the VMM is in UP state (i.e., 
the token is in Ph1up) or FP state (i.e., the token is in Ph1fp) and the shared storage is in UP state, the VM can be 
restarted to UP state (i.e., the token is in place Pvup) by firing the timed transition Tvrestart. When VM is in FAIL or 
CRASH states, it is suspended and a warm-VM reboot mechanism is used later on. 
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(a)  NNNN and TNNN 
 
(b) TNFN 
Figure. 3. SRN models for VM with (a) NNNN and TNNN and (b) TNFN policies 
 
Table 3. Guard functions for NNNN, TNNN and TNFN policies 
Guard Definition 
gw1up if(#(Pw1up)==1) then 1 else 0 
gw1dw if(#(Pw1fail)==1) then 1 else 0 
gs1up if(#(Ph1up)==1||#(Ph1fp)==1&&#(Pup)==1) then 1 else 0 
gs1dw if(#(Ph1fail)==1||#(Ph1dw)==1||#(Ph1crash)==1||#(Pfail)==1) then 1 else 0 
gh1trig if(#(Ph1trigger)==1&&#(Pw1up)==1) then 1 else 0 
gh1rej if(#(Ph1clock)==1&&#(Pw1up)==1) then 1 else 0 
gh1interval if(#(Ph1up)==1||#(Ph1fp)==1) then 1 else 0 
gh1policy if(#(Pvdw)==1) then 1 else 0 
gh1reset If(#(Ph1reju)==1) then 1 else 0 
gvswitch If (#(Phup)==1||#(Phfp)==1&&#(Pup)==1&&(#(Pvcrash)==1||#(Pvfail)==1)) then 1 else 0 
 
Policy TNFN uses failover mechanism (see Figure 3(b)). Thus, there are two VMs (active and standby VM) on 
the VMM. Using a heartbeat mechanism, the running state of the active VM can be stored in the shared storage and 
later be sent to the standby VM. When the active VM suffers from non-aging Mandelbug-related or aging-related 
failures, the active VM stops accepting requests. That is, the token is moved from Pvstandby to Pvup by firing the 
immediate transition tvswitch. Then, the standby VM is responsible of the tasks and plays the role of the active VM 
during its repair period. At the same time, the token is moved from Pvcrash (or Pvfail) to Pvstandby by firing the timed 
transition Tvreup (or Tvrepair). That is, the primary active VM changes to be standby VM after the repair or recovery 
processes complete. 
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Figure. 4. SRN models for VM with TNNM and TTNM policies (places and transitions added by TTNM 
policy are highlighted in gray) 
 
 
Figure. 5. SRN models for VM with TPNM policies  
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Figure. 6. SRN models for VM with TNFM and TTFM policies (places and transitions added by TTFM policy 
are highlighted in gray) 
 
 
Figure. 7. SRN models for VM with TPFM policy  
 
TNNM, TTNM, and TPNM policies use live VM migration to counteract the VMM rejuvenation. The VM 
rejuvenation mechanism is the difference between these policies. Since the failover mechanism is unimplemented, 
there is only one active VM on Main host and there is no standby VM on both Main host and Backup host for each 
policy. TNNM policy consists of eight submodels: (1) Host1 and (2) Host2 models as depicted in Figure 2(a); (3) 
shared storage model shown in Figure 2(b); (4) VMM1 and (5) VMM2 models as depicted in Figure 2(c); (6) VMM1 
and (7) VMM2 clock models shown in Figure 2(d); and (8) VM model shown in Figure 4 (without considering 
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places and transitions highlighted in gray area). Policies TTNM and TPNM consist of nine and eight submodels, 
respectively. The first seven submodels are the same as in TNNM policy. TTNM policy adds two submodels: VM 
model depicted in Figure 4 (considering places and transitions highlighted in gray area) and VM clock model shown 
in Figure 2(e). On the contrary, TPNM policy only adds the VM model depicted in Figure 5. Guard functions used 
in VM models of these policies are summarized in Table 4.  
Finally, we describe the submodels for TNFM, TTFM, and TPFM policies. TNFM policy consists of eight 
submodels, where (1)-(7) submodels are the same as TNNM policy and (8) VM model as depicted in Figure 6. 
Similarly, TTFM policy consists of nine submodels, while TPFM policy has eight. In both cases, (1)-(7) submodels 
are the same as in TNNM policy. TTFM policy adds two submodels: VM clock model shown in Figure 2(e) and the 
VM model depicted in Figure 6. Note that transitions highlighted in the gray are have a different guard with respect 
to TNFM policy. TPFM policy has the VM model shown in Figure 7. The explanations of these models are similar 
to the ones described previously. Particular guard functions used in VM models of these three policies are 
summarized in Table 5. The reward functions for the nine models are shown in Table 6. Since the failure and 
recovery processes of host, shared storage, and VMM are the same as in those in Section 4.2, in the following we 
focus on the VM models. 
VM model using time-based rejuvenation. First, we explain the VM model for TTNM policy, which uses time-
based rejuvenation for VM. Initially, there exists one token in Pv1up, representing the active VM in fully stable state. 
Later, the active VM transits to FP state (namely, the token is placed in Pv1fp) through the transition Tv1fp representing 
the VM software aging. When VM fails due to software aging occurrence but the VM rejuvenation process is not 
triggered, the token is moved to Pv1fail by firing the transition Tv1fail. After VM completes its repair, it changes to UP 
state. That is, a token is taken from Pv1fail to Pv1up. Finally, when the VM suffers from a non-aging Mandelbug-related 
failure, the VM turns to CRASH state (i.e., a token is taken from Pv1up to Pv1crash) and waits for repair. When the VM 
is rejuvenated, the token is moved from Pv1up (or Pv1fp) to Pv1rej. As soon as the VM rejuvenation process completes, 
the token returns back to pv1up by firing the timed transition Tv1rej. 
When the VMM is in FAIL, DOWN, or CRASH states or if the shared storage fails, the VM in UP or FP state 
changes to DOWN state (i.e., a token is moved from Pv1up or Pv1fp to place Pv1dw). When VM is in FAIL or CRASH 
state at this time, it is suspended and later a warm-VM reboot mechanism is used. When the VMM is in UP or FP 
state (places Ph1up or Ph1fp, respectively) and if the shared storage is UP state, the VM is restarted to UP state (place 
Pv1up) by firing the timed transition Tv1restart. When the VMM starts rejuvenation and the VM is in UP or FP states, 
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the VM will migrate to Backup host whether it is in UP or FP states. If the VM has been migrated to Backup host, 
the failure, recovery, and rejuvenation behaviors of the VM on the VMM2 is equal to the ones on the VMM1. Details 
of the live VM migration process are described in Section 4.4. 
 
Table 4. Guard function of VM Models for TNNM, TTNM and TPNM policies 
Guard Definition 
gw1up if(#(Pw1up)==1) then 1 else 0 
gw1dw if(#(Pw1fail)==1) then 1 else 0 
gh1rej if(#(Ph1clock)==1&&#(Pw1up)==1) then 1 else 0 
gh1trig if(#(Ph1trigger)==1&&#(Pw1up)==1) then 1 else 0 
gw2up if(#(Pw2up)==1) then 1 else 0 
gw2dw if(#(Pw2fail)==1) then 1 else 0 
gh2rej if(#(Ph2clock)==1&&#(Pw2up)==1) then 1 else 0 
gh2trig if(#(Ph2trigger)==1&&#(Pw2up)==1) then 1 else 0 
gh1interval if(#(Ph1up)==1||#(Ph1fp)==1) then 1 else 0 
gh1policy if(#(Pv1up)==0&&#(Pv1fp)==0&&#(Pvpre)==0&&#(Pvmig)==0&&#(Pvback)==0&&#(Pvfpback)==0) then 1 else 0 
gh1reset If(#(Ph1reju)==1) then 1 else 0 
gh2interval if(#(Ph2up)==1||#(Ph2fp)==1) then 1 else 0 
gh2policy if(#(Pv2up)==0&&#(Pv2fp)==0&&#(Pvpre)==0&&#(Pvmig)==0&&#(Pvback)==0&&#(Pvfpback)==0) then 1 else 0 
gh2reset If(#(Ph2reju)==1) then 1 else 0 
gs1up if(#(Ph1up)==1||#(Ph1fp)==1&&#(Pup)==1) then 1 else 0 
gs1dw if(#(Ph1fail)==1||#(Ph1dw)==1||#(Ph1crash)==1||#(Pfail)==1) then 1 else 0 
gs2up if(#(Ph2up)==1||#(Ph2fp)==1&&#(Pup)==1) then 1 else 0 
gs2dw if(#(Ph2fail)==1||#(Ph2dw)==1||#(Ph2crash)==1||#(Pfail)==1) then 1 else 0 
gvpre if(#(Ph1policy)==1&&(#(Ph2up)==1||#(Ph2fp)==1)&&#(Pup)==1) then 1 else 0 
gvback if(#(Ph2policy)==1&&(#(Ph1up)==1||#(Ph1fp)==1)&&#(Pup)==1) then 1 else 0 
gv1trig if(#(Pvtrigger)==1&&#(Pup)==1) then 1 else 0 
gv2trig if(#(Pvtrigger)==1&&#(Pup)==1) then 1 else 0 
gvinterval if(#(Ph1up)==1||#(Ph1fp)==1||#(Ph2up)==1||#(Ph2fp)==1&&#(Pup)==1) then 1 else 0 
gvpolicy if(#(Ph1up)==1||#(Ph1fp)==1||#(Ph2up)==1||#(Ph2fp)==1) then 1 else 0 
gvreset if(#(Pv1rej)==1||#(Pv2rej)==1) then 1 else 0 
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Table 5. Guard functions of VM models for TNFM, TTFM and TPFM policies 
Guard Definition 
gv1switch_TNFM If(#(Ph1up)==1||#(Ph1fp)==1&&#(Pup)==1&&(#(Pv1crash)==1||#(Pv1fail)==1)) then 1 else 0 
gv2switch_TNFM If(#(Ph2up)==1||#(Ph2fp)==1&&#(Pup)==1&&(#(Pv2crash)==1||#(Pv2fail)==1)) then 1 else 0 
gv1switch_TTFM If(#(Ph1up)==1||#(Ph1fp)==1&&#(Pup)==1&&(#(Pv1crash)==1||#(Pv1fail)==1)||#(Pv1rej)==1)) then 1 else 0 
gv2switch_TTFM If(#(Ph2up)==1||#(Ph2fp)==1&&#(Pup)==1&&(#(Pv2crash)==1||#(Pv2fail)==1)||#(Pv2rej)==1)) then 1 else 0 
gv1switch_TPFM If(#(Ph1up)==1||#(Ph1fp)==1&&#(Pup)==1&&(#(Pv1crash)==1||#(Pv1fail)==1)||#(Pv1reju)==1)) then 1 else 0 
gv2switch_TPFM If(#(Ph2up)==1||#(Ph2fp)==1&&#(Pup)==1&&(#(Pv2crash)==1||#(Pv2fail)==1)||#(Pv2reju)==1)) then 1 else 0 
 
Table 6. Reward rates for computing the steady-state unavailability of different models 
Policy Unavailability condition  
NNNN, TNNN if(#(Pvdw)==1||#(Pvfail)==1||#(Pvcrash)==1) then 1 else 0 
TNFN if(#(Pvdw)==1) then 1 else 0 
TNNM, TTNM if(#(Pv1dw)==1||#(Pv1fail)==1||#(Pv1crash)==1||#(Pv2dw)==1||#(Pv2fail)==1||#(Pv2crash)==1||#(Pvmigf)==1||#(
Pvfpbackf)==1) then 1 else 0 
TPNM if(#(Pv1dw)==1||#(Pv1fail)==1||#(Pv1crash)==1||#(Pdetect1)==1||#(Pv1reju)==1#(Pdetect2)==1||#(Pv2reju)==1||#(
Pv2dw)==1||#(Pv2fail)==1||#(Pv2crash)==1||#(Pvmigf)==1||#(Pvfpbackf)==1) then 1 else 0 
TNFM if(#(Pv1dw)==1||#(Pv1fail)==1||#(Pv1crash)==1||#(Pv2dw)==1||#(Pv2fail)==1||#(Pv2crash)==1||#(Pvmigf)==1||#(
Pvfpbackf)==1) then 1 else 0 
TTFM if(#(Pv1dw)==1||#(Pv2dw)==1||#(Pvmigf)==1||#(Pvfpbackf)==1) then 1 else 0 
TPFM if(#(Pv1dw)==1||#(Pv2dw)==1||#(Pvmigf)==1||#(Pvudf)==1||#(Pdetect1)==1||#(Pdetect2)==1) then 1 else 0 
 
VM model using prediction-based rejuvenation. In this part we detail the VM model for TPNM policy, which 
uses prediction-based rejuvenation for VM (see Figure 5). Initially, there exists a token in Pv1up, representing the 
fully stable state of VM. At time passes, the VM eventually transits to a FP state, that is, a token is taken from Pv1up 
and placed in Pv1fp through the transition Tv1fp representing the software aging of the VM. It is assumed that RM 
detects VM software aging with probability λdetect. Thus, place Pv1fp has two immediate transitions with appropriate 
probabilities for detecting aging or failures. When the aging is detected, the immediate transition tdetect1 fires and the 
token is deposited in Pdetect1. Otherwise (i.e., detection fails), the token in place Pv1fp is deposited in Pundetect1. In 
DETECT state (represented by Pdetect1), the VM finishes its tasks in hand and stops receiving requests. After a 
preparing process, the VM gets ready to be rejuvenated, which is represented by firing of transition Tswt1reju (that is, 
the token is deposited in Pv1reju). When the VM ends rejuvenation, the transition Tv1reju fires and the token is placed 
in Pv1up, which represents the VM is in UP state. In UNDETECT state (place Pundetect1), the token is moved to Pv1fail 
by firing the transition tv1fail when the VM failure occurs due to software aging. Otherwise (i.e., when the VM suffers 
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from a non-aging Mandelbug-related failure), the VM falls to CRASH state (i.e., the token is taken from place Pv1up 
to place Pv1crash). 
As before, when the VMM is in FAIL, DOWN, or CRASH state, or if the shared storage fails, the VM in UP, 
FP, or UNDETECT state changes to DOWN state (i.e., the token is moved from Pv1up, Pv1fp, or Pundetect1 to place 
Pv1dw). When VM is in FAIL, DETECT, REJU, or CRASH states at this time, its execution is suspended and later a 
warm-VM reboot mechanism is used. When the VMM is in UP or FP state and the shared storage is in UP state, 
then the VM is restarted to UP state by firing the timed transition Tv1start. When the VMM is going to be rejuvenated 
and the VM is in UP or FP state, the VM migrates to Backup host whether this host is in UP or FP state as well. 
Once the VM was migrated, failure, recovery, and rejuvenation behaviors of the VM on the VMM2 are similar to 
the ones on the VMM1. The process of live VM migration is described in the sequel. 
4.4. Live VM Migration Process 
 At the beginning, the VM is on the VMM1 of Main host. When the clock of VMM1 requests rejuvenation for 
VMM1, the guard gvpre enables Tvpre and Tvudpre (Tvfppre) for live VM migration as long as VMM2 is available. When 
the live VM migration is completed, the token is deposited in Pv2up and Pundetect2 (Pv2fp) each. Note that the live 
migration may fail with probability (1 − λmigs). When the VM migration fails, transition tvmigf and tvpref are fired and 
the token arrives at Pvmigf. Then, the token is deposited in pv1up by firing the transition Tv1new when the VMM1 is in 
UP or FP state. Otherwise, if the token is deposited in Pv2up (VM is migrated from its UP state) or Pundetect2 (VM is 
migrated from its UNDETECT state) or Pv2fp (VM is migrated from its FP state), VMM1 rejuvenation starts. On the 
contrary, when the token is deposited in Pvpre, Pvmig, Pvudback (Pvfpback) and Pvback, the VMM1 cannot be rejuvenated, 
since VMM1 is still being used and the migration process has not completed yet. 
5. Numerical Analysis and Discussions 
We use the Stochastic Petri Net package (SPNP) tool [31] to carry out numerical analysis of the nine policies 
models. The Gauss-Seidel method [33] is used to improve computation precision. Model parameter values are set 
according to the existing related literature [20]-[24] and summarized in Table 2. In the following, we analyze steady-
state availability, downtime, and parameter sensitivity of the system under aforementioned policies. Note that 
steady-state availability is often specified as a number of nines in Service Level Agreement (SLA) documents as a 
marketing feature [37]. However, using the ‘nines’ has been in question because it could not appropriately reflect 
the variations of steady-state availability with its time of occurrence [37]. Moreover, it is hard to apply the number 
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of nines in modeling and formula. Therefore, as in the existing research papers, this paper uses the probability to 
denote steady-state availability. 
5.1. Steady-State Availability Analysis 
This section performs numerical analysis by using default settings. Table 7 shows the steady-state availability 
(SSA) for each policy. As expected, we observe that the more HA mechanisms deployed, the higher the VM 
availability is. In the sequel, we investigate the effect of VMM clock interval on SSA. 
We first compare NNNN, TNNN, and TNFN policies. As Table 7 indicates, NNNN policy with no rejuvenation 
for VMM and VM achieves the lowest SSA of 0.97168871533. When VMM time-based rejuvenation mechanism 
is considered (TNNN policy), SSA improves to 0.989856441223 and further to 0.991734992389 with VM failover 
mechanism for VM (TNFN policy). Note that the significance of the SSA improvement depends on the concrete 
scenario where it is used. For example, the formula for calculating Downtime (measured in hours) is normally (1-
SSA)×8760. Here, 8760 is the number of hours of 365 days. In this scenario, the SSA improvement 0.018167726 
from NNNN to TNNN becomes significant. 
We now vary the VMM clock interval from 10 hours to 300 hours. Note that this variation has no effect on SSA 
of NNNN policy but effectively affects to SSA of TNNN and TNFN policies. Figure 8 plots the SSA of both TNNN 
and TNFN policies while varying the VMM clock interval from 10 hours to 300 hours. Based on our results, we 
observe that: 
(1) SSA of both TNNN and TNFN policies are improved with the increasing interval of VMM clock when the 
interval is small. For example, less than 90h. This is because the frequently VMM rejuvenation leads to VM 
shut down more often, and then makes the VM SSA lower. 
(2) SSA of both TNNN and TNFN policies stops increasing and starts to decrease when the VMM clock interval 
reaches a certain value. In our numerical analysis, this value is 260 hours for TNNN policy and 160 hours 
for TNFN policy. The reason behind this fact is that the less frequent rejuvenation, the more frequent VMM 
software aging-related failure occurrence. Accordingly, the SSA of VM decreases due to the close 
dependencies between VMM and VM, as mentioned in Section 3.2. 
(3) Failover helps to improve SSA. When the VMM clock interval is set to 10 hours, there is an obvious SSA 
improvement. 
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We then compare the failover mechanism with live VM migration by comparing TNFN, TNNM, and TNFM 
policies. Results are shown in Figure 9. Note that the results of TNFN policy (see Figure 8) are also depicted in this 
figure to highlight the difference between TNFN and TNNM policies. We observe that the SSA of TNNM policy 
increases from 0.989520273 to 0.989847214 when the VMM clock interval ranges from 5 hours to 15 hours. The 
reason is that frequent VMM rejuvenation leads to frequent VM migration and hence, the SSA decreases due to VM 
migration failures. These results suggest to migrate VM so often can be counterproductive. But as the VMM clock 
interval further increases, SSA under TNNM decreases and approximates to SSA under TNNN policy. The reason 
is that the chance of triggering a live VM migration caused by VMM rejuvenation is reduced when the VMM clock 
interval is large. 
Table 7. Steady-state availability (SSA) of the system for each policy under given parameters  
Policy NNNN TNNN TNFN TNNM TTNM 
SSA 0.97168871533 0.98956441223 0.991734992389 0.989617052647 0.998677663722 
 
Policy TPNM TNFM TTFM TPFM 
SSA 0.999436751527 0.998314139248 0.99968371 0.999927083 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure. 8. Steady-state availability of (a) TNNN and (b) TNFN policies 
 
It is also observed that the SSA of TNFM policy increases from 0.997935120797 to 0.998092670444 when the 
VMM clock interval ranges between 20 to 60 hours, since less VMM rejuvenation leads to less VM migration failure 
occurrences and thus, there is a less effect of migration failures. Similarly, when the VMM clock interval is larger 
than 60 hours, the SSA of TNFM policy decreases and even becomes smaller than under small VMM clock interval, 
but still outperforms to TNFN and TNNM policies. The reason is that when the VMM rejuvenation is less frequent 
the VMM may fail easily due to VMM software aging. Hence, the VM has to shut down due to VMM aging failure 
leading to a decreasing of SSA. 
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These results also indicate that failover mechanism performs better than live VM migration mechanism, in terms 
of improving SSA. Recall that TNFN policy with failover mechanism reduces downtime caused by VM aging or 
non-aging Mandelbug-related failures, but however, VM is shut down when VMM fails or rejuvenates. Hence, this 
leads to great transition loss similar to cold-VM rejuvenation. TNNM policy using live VM migration reduces the 
downtime caused by VMM rejuvenation, but downtime caused by VM aging or non-aging Mandelbug related 
failures cannot be overcome. On the contrary, TNFM policy outperforms both TNNM and TNFN policies by using 
failover and live VM migration mechanisms together. In this way, we avoid downtime caused by VM aging and 
non-aging Mandelbug-related failures and also minimize the impact of VMM rejuvenation. As summary, TNFM 
policy outperforms the others, in terms of SSA. 
Finally, we investigate the effect of VM rejuvenation mechanisms on SSA using TNNM, TTNM, and TPNM 
policies. Figure 10 plots the SSA of these policies while varying the VMM clock interval, assuming only live VM 
migration enabled. Both VM time-based and prediction-based rejuvenation mechanisms improve SSA compared 
with no rejuvenation. In addition, the results show that predication-based mechanism outperforms time-based 
mechanism under high software aging detection probability. 
Figure 11 plots the SSA of these policies while varying the VMM clock interval, assuming both VM failover 
and live migration are deployed. These results confirm that: (1) VM rejuvenation is an effective way to improve the 
SSA; and (2) predication-based mechanism performs better than time-based mechanism. In addition, these results 
indicate that the SSA of TTFM and TPFM policies increase slowly as long as the VMM clock interval increases. 
However, after 260 hours, the value of VMM clock interval has little impact on the SSA of these policies (Figure 
12 shows the precise variation of SSA). Figure 11 also shows how the SSA of TNFM policy decreases as the VMM 
clock interval increases, similar to the previous case (see Figure 11). As shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11, the 
combination of failover and live VM migration mechanisms performs better than when individual mechanisms are 
applied. 
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Figure. 9. Steady-state availability of TNFN, TNNM and TNFM policies by varying the VMM clock interval 
 
 
Figure. 10. Steady-state availability of TNNM, TTNM and TPNM policies by varying the VMM clock 
interval 
 
 
Figure. 11. Steady-state availability of TNFM, TTFM and TPFM policies by varying the VMM clock 
interval 
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Figure. 12. Detail of steady-state availability of TTFM and TPFM policies by varying the VMM clock 
interval 
5.2. Downtime Analysis 
Figure 13 shows the downtime per year of the nine policies. Downtime is measured in the order of hours. Results 
show that the best policy is TPFM, achieving a downtime near to 40 minutes, while the worst policy is NNNN that 
achieves a downtime about 248.07 hours. Using failover mechanism reduces the downtime caused by VM non-
aging Mandelbug-related or aging-related failures in active VM, since it is less transaction loss as the tasks reload 
to standby VM quickly. Similarly, using live VM migration technique can also reduce the downtime caused by the 
VMM rejuvenation by migrating the active VM to other host, while the active VM can nearly keep running due to 
pre-copy policy. 
 
Figure. 13. Downtime per year for the nine policies 
5.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
Previous results show that software rejuvenation, failover, and live migration techniques are effective HA 
mechanisms for improving VM availability. Parameter values can, however, produce influence on model results as 
Section 5.1 shown by the effect of VMM clock interval. In this section, we aim to perform the sensitivity analysis 
in terms of live migration successful probability, VM rejuvenation clock interval, aging detection probability, VM 
and VMM aging rates. This analysis becomes critical to choose an appropriate combination of these HA techniques. 
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5.3.1 Live migration successful probability 
We first remove VM rejuvenation and failover mechanisms to investigate how probability of a successful live 
VM migration affects SSA. We then add VM rejuvenation considering time-based and prediction-based VM 
rejuvenation. These results are shown in Figure 14. We notice that the larger live VM migration successful 
probability, the higher SSA is. In addition, we observe that prediction-based still outperforms time-based VM 
rejuvenation. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Figure. 14. SSA of (a) TNNM, (b) TTNM and (c) TPNM policies by varying the probability of a live 
VM successful migration  
5.3.2 VM clock interval 
We now further examine the effect of other parameters. Figure 15 depicts how the VM clock interval, 
ranging from 10 to 200 hours, affects SSA in TTNM policy. SSA increases from 0.997940680365 to 
0.998704632303 when VM clock interval ranges from 10 to 40 hours. Note that in TTNM policy without 
failover mechanism, frequent VM rejuvenation may lead to more transaction loss and hence, the SSA will 
decrease. Similarly, SSA starts to decrease when the VM clock interval is bigger than 40 hours since by 
increasing VM clock interval, the VM fails more easily due to VM software aging before its rejuvenation. 
Hence, the appropriate settings of the VMM and VM rejuvenation triggering intervals will maximize the VM 
SSA.  
 
Figure. 15. Steady-state availability of TTNM policy by varying the VM clock interval 
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5.3.3 Aging detection probability 
Figure 16 describes SSA of TPNM policy by varying aging detection probability. As expected, analytical 
results show that a higher aging detection probability leads to a higher SSA. In summary, we observe that a proper 
combination of VMM and VM rejuvenation becomes useful to gain high levels of SSA. 
 
Figure. 16. Steady-state availability of TPNM policy by varying the probability of aging detection 
 
5.3.4 VM and VMM aging rates 
This section shows the effects of both VM and VMM aging rates on SSA. All VMs on the same VMM share the 
physical memory. Thus, both VM and VMM aging rates depend on the workload running on the system, in terms 
of VMs and the software running on them. Thus, this section results could reflect the effect of varying workload on 
the capability of each policy. The above numerical analysis results validate the ability of predication-based VM 
rejuvenation mechanism. Thus, we focus on investigating NNNN, TNNN, TNFN, TNNM, TPNM, TNFM, and 
TPFM. Numerical analysis is carried out by varying VM aging time from 2 days to 12 and varying VMM from 15 
days to 45 days, respectively. Figure 17(a) and Figure 18 (a) show the results. Figure 17(b) and Figure 18 (b) detail 
the variation of steady-state availability under TPFM, TNFM and TPNM. These results confirm the conclusion of 
Section 5.1 about the capability of each policy. We could observe that 
(1) VMM time-based rejuvenation mechanism significantly improves VM steady-state availability. 
(2) Failover mechanism works better than live migration mechanism, verified by Figure 9 results. 
(3) VM predication-based rejuvenation technique could further improve steady-state probability. 
(4) The SSA improvement from TNNM to TPNM is larger than from TNNM to TNFM, suggesting probability 
of detecting aging successfully is more important than failover mechanism parameter in terms of improving 
SSA.   
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(5) The SSA improvement from TNNN to TNNF is larger than from TNNN to TNNM, suggesting failover 
mechanism parameter is more important than probability of successful live VM migration in terms of 
improving SSA.   
 
 
(a) (b)z 
Figure. 17. Steady-state availability under different policies by varying the VM aging time 
 
 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure. 18. Steady-state availability under different policies by varying the VMM aging time 
6. Conclusions and Future Work 
This paper applies Stochastic Reward Nets to analyze the effect of diverse high-availability techniques on the 
VM steady-state availability in a virtualized system composed of three components (a main host and a backup host 
containing a VMM and VMs, respectively, and a management host) connected to a shared storage, under a variety 
of failures. In particular, we consider main host, backup host, shared storage, VMM, and VM failures. As high-
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availability techniques, in this paper we study VM and VMM time-based and prediction-based rejuvenation, VM 
failover, and live VM migration. Our numerical results indicate that: (i) VMM clock interval is a critical factor for 
the ability of live VM migration technique in improving VM SSA; (ii) the combination of failover mechanism with 
live VM migration significantly improve VM availability; and (iii) VM prediction-based rejuvenation outperforms 
VM time-based rejuvenation, in terms of steady-state availability. 
In this paper, we focus on the VM steady-state analysis. It is known that transient availability evaluation is 
important for a highly dependable system in some cases. We plan to expand the proposed models to analyze the VM 
survivability when a system failure occurs. It is noticed that, as the existing work on analyzing the availability of a 
virtualized system, this paper considered a simple system aging model, namely exponential distribution with fixed 
rate. However, the aging phenomena of a complex system is a result of a variety of factors, including memory 
utilization increase due to memory leaks, resources saturation, and error accumulation, etc.. Thus, we plan to extend 
the proposed modeling and analysis to the virtualized system with a more realistic aging process. In addition, we 
will consider multiple instances of standby and active VM running in the same active host, as well as multiple 
instances of standby VM maintained in the same backup host. Moreover, we will use these analysis results to design 
an automatic parameter setting mechanism for finding the appropriate values to maximize SSA while minimizing 
the cost of each HA technique implementation and deployment.  
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